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1. Introduction 
 
Contemporary trends towards neoliberal conservation, and emerging markets for ecosystem 
products and services, have attracted much recent academic and policy attention. Critical 
debate has focused variously on the causes and consequences of new forms of valuing ‘nature’ 
as a commodity (McAfee 2011, Arsel and Büscher 2012); the effectiveness or otherwise of 
market mechanisms and offsets for addressing environmental problems (e.g. Bohm and Dabhi 
2009), and the ways schemes and projects are experienced on the ground – including new forms 
of resource distribution and appropriation (e.g. Fairhead et al 2012).  
 
In this broader context forest carbon schemes, including  REDD and REDD+ ,  are a particular 
focus of policy attention. As international agencies, governments, funders and private 
companies work to create ‘REDD readiness’ and design and implement schemes throughout the 
world, vibrant and growing research attention is exploring the feasibility and effects of this 
particular form of market environmentalism.  A rapidly growing literature addresses   the  
governance of forest carbon and REDD+ schemes (e.g. Corbera and Brown 2008, Corbera and 
Schroeder 2010, Schlamadinger et al 2007), and their distributional effects.   
 
This article focuses on a hitherto neglected aspect of the debate about neo-liberal 
environmental governance: the politics of modelling and measurement. Market-oriented 
environmental schemes have developed along with complex measurement and monitoring, 
review and verification (MRV) procedures to legitimate the production of commodities such as 
carbon. Seeing MRV as a technical necessity, international attention has focused on designing 
and refining ‘better’ procedures, and building the capacities of governments and other 
organisations to operationalise them, while others focus on the practical and funding difficulties 
of MRV in resource-poor settings. Yet here we analyse measurement and modelling as not just a 
technical exercise, but a process shaped by and carrying social, political-economic and even 
moral implications. Drawing on perspectives in science and technology studies that address the 
mutual construction (Shackley and Wynne 1995) or co-production (Jasanoff 2004) of science, 
policy and social order;  the sociology of modelling (Magnani and Nercessian 2009; Morgan and 
Morrison 1999, Morgan 2009), and the politics of policy processes (Keeley and Scoones 2003), 
we suggest that modelling and measurement processes have social and political lives (Leach and 
Scoones 2013) – referring to the ways they are developed, shaped and applied in interaction 
with – or co-constructed with – the politics of policy.  In the context of environmental and forest 
carbon governance, we therefore ask:  How do particular forms of modelling and measurement 
emerge in interaction with the politics and political economy of carbon markets? How do they 
frame the ways environmental problems and human-environment interactions are assessed? 
Which project pathways and associated social and moral values are thus promoted, and which 
are excluded?    
 
To explore these questions, and illustrate the social and political lives of measurement and 
modelling in operation, we focus on the case of forest carbon projects in West Africa.  This is an 
apt focus not just because of the plethora of contemporary REDD-related initiatives there, but 
also because it enables us to build on earlier analysis (Fairhead and Leach 1998) to show how 
current forest carbon assessments build on and reinvoke the layered legacies of earlier rounds 
of mutually-constructed forest science and policy.  West Africa’s forest zone has long been a 
focus of scientific and policy concern about deforestation and its consequences. The moist and 
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semi-deciduous forests that stretch across  Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote D’Ivoire and Ghana have 
attracted particular attention as the assumed remainder of a once extensive Upper Guinean 
forest block, progressively reduced through farming, logging and fire-related savannisation. 
Since early colonial times convictions of rapid and ongoing forest loss have driven policies to halt 
deforestation and conserve what are assumed to be remaining forest fragments, whether to 
safeguard hydrology, agro-ecological productivity, timber or biodiversity ‘hotspots’ (Bakarr et al 
1999; Conservation International 2008). Global climate change mitigation now adds a new layer 
to these imperatives. Widely-cited views that ‘Africa’s tropical forests are an important store of 
carbon... [yet] Africa’s forests are being lost at around three times the world average’ (Mercer et 
al 2011) are motivating a new round of policy initiatives and projects aimed at carbon forestry: 
conserving and enhancing forest carbon stocks, and trading these values in emerging carbon 
markets. 
 
Modelling and measurement have always played central roles in framing and justifying forest 
policy initiatives in the region. While techniques, technologies and underlying theories have 
varied, Fairhead and Leach (1998) identified key continuities in the production and use of 
‘forests of statistics’ in West Africa. Portrayals of forest cover and quality as declining, linearly, 
rapidly and recently, from an earlier ‘baseline’ state of ‘intact’ forest repeatedly construct 
deforestation as an urgent problem requiring external intervention.   Widely-circulating figures 
suggesting that only 13% of West Africa’s ‘original’ forest cover remains (Sayer et al 1992) or 
that countries have lost 70-90% of their 1900 forest area (e.g. Gornitz and NASA 1985) are 
joined by recent versions: for instance  ‘Around the turn of the century, West Africa had some 
193,000 sq. miles (500,000 sq. km) of coastal rainforest but today [they]...have been largely 
depleted ......Now ... only 22.8 percent of West Africa's moist forests remain, much of this 
degraded’ (Mongabay 2012). Such views support local and national measurements similarly 
suggesting accelerating deforestation.   
 
Yet as Fairhead and Leach’s (1998) detailed exploration revealed, such modelling and 
measurement and its broader assumptions are partial, ignoring and occluding insights and 
perspectives from, inter alia, history, non-equilibrium ecology, anthropology, and local forest 
users’ experience. In many instances statistics have thus exaggerated the extent and rate of 
forest loss while obscuring more complex, non-linear people-vegetation relationships, including 
anthropogenic woodland and forest expansion. Local forest users have sometimes suffered 
stigma, blame, coercive policies and loss of resource control for supposedly causing 
deforestation that has not actually happened – while alternative landscape and policy pathways 
are neglected. This analysis and subsequent supportive debate (e.g. Grainger 2007, Munro 
2009) thus underlined how forest measurement and modelling is shaped by and carries social, 
political-economic and even moral implications.  
 
Today, it is the new policy context and political economy of carbon that now dominates forest 
models, measurement and verification of change, in West Africa and beyond. A new round of 
production of forest statistics is underway, shaped not just by up-to-date remote-sensing and 
measurement techniques, but also by new protocols focused on counting and accounting for 
forest carbon as a commodity. Extending Fairhead and Leach’s (1998) analysis, we explore how 
longer-established assessments, shaped by earlier forest policy imperatives, are being re-
invoked and re-worked amidst current carbon concerns. We argue that forms of forest carbon 
governmentality (Gordon 1991) or environmentality (Agarwal 2005) are thus emerging in which 
certain pathways of intervention and landscape change are enabled and others excluded. This 
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brings risks of negative implications for local forest users – sometimes despite the best 
intentions of project proponents.  
 
In the following section, we introduce the social and political lives of forest carbon 
measurement and modelling procedures. We then illustrate the application of these procedures 
in forest carbon project designs in Sierra Leone and in Ghana. Neither project has yet been 
implemented, and indeed our analysis raises questions about implementation feasibility as well 
as form. Our methodological focus is therefore not on project enactment in practice, but on 
project design: Through document analysis and key informant interviews we analyse the 
assumptions and exclusions in assessment, modelling and measurement procedures, the ways 
particular occlusions are manifested in project documents, and the ways these shape possible 
pathways of project direction, landscape and social change.  The particular methods we focus 
on, as used in the two case studies, are two of a growing array of such accounting procedures, 
used across the world in forest carbon projects.  Our aim is not to critique the details of these 
particular methods, but to raise and illustrate a broader conceptual point - about the ways that 
methodologies frame problem definition, project design and exclusions  –  that all who apply 
these methods globally should be more aware of.  
 
2. Carbon political-economies, policies, values and measures 
 
The context for current political and policy interest in forest carbon is the central challenge, in 
mitigating climate change, of devising mechanisms so that less carbon is released into the 
atmosphere. As an alternative or complement to strict regulation of polluting nations, the 
creation of a market for carbon, putting a tradeable value on emissions reduced, offered a 
seemingly neat solution. Through successive climate change negotiation rounds this became 
embedded in the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms through the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), and was subsequently extended to voluntary schemes, operating in private markets and 
with some overseen by standard-setting organisations such as the Verified Carbon Standard 
(VCS). In relation to forests, carbon market solutions became part of so-called REDD (Reduced 
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) and REDD-plus schemes (Angelsen et al, 2011). 
A vast plethora of forest carbon schemes has now been developed by private companies, NGOs, 
governments and donor agencies, and – supported by academics and consultancy firms – an 
associated industry in carbon valuation and assessment has developed. Numerous standards 
and protocols have been created, and methodologies devised. 
 
Yet in their social and political lives, these methodologies have been co-constructed with a 
common set of policy imperatives and disciplinary expertises, creating commonalities across the 
array. In order to link finance – either private or public – to climate investments, clear 
monitoring, review and verification (MRV) systems must be in place to avoid fraud and 
diversion, and to ensure, ultimately, that carbon is not released, and climate change mitigation 
actually occurs.  Underlying this is the broad view that carbon can and must be seen as a 
commodity: be given financial value and be tradable. Carbon sequestration in one place can be 
paid for by emitters in another place in order to deliver a global good. These people and sites 
thus become connected through the market, and the carbon in them must be viewed as 
commensurable (Lohmann 2009) – with one measure of carbon in an African forest equivalent 
to one emitted from a smokestack in Europe. This  argument can be traced to the work of 
climate modellers in producing ideas around global carbon cycles and raising the profile of 
climate change as a public policy issue (Shackley and Wynne 1996), linking with longstanding 
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economic arguments for monetary valuation of the environment to account for externalities 
due to pollution (Pearce et al 1989, Barbier 2007). To enable markets and trade to emerge, 
accountancy techniques were incorporated while in the forestry and land use arena, biologists 
were further deployed to produce clear metrics for carbon in different settings, and ways of 
measuring these.  Through such interactions, by the 2000s a new market had been created for a 
commodity that previously had little or no value, operating on a global scale. In this context, 
thousands of projects of varying scales have emerged in nearly every country of the world.  
 
In important ways, this is a remarkable achievement. Yet as others have pointed out, the 
creation of carbon markets is part of a wider political economy of carbon with implications for 
both equity and longer term sustainability (Newell et al 2012, Mitchell 2011). The 
commoditisation of carbon, as part of broader processes of neoliberalisation and revaluation of 
nature, has distributional consequences, both intended and unintended (Fairhead et al 2012; 
Buscher et al 2012; McAfee 2012, Peluso 2012, Robertson 2006).  Our focus on measurement 
protocols in forest carbon projects offers a particular contribution to this debate. 
 
The schemes we address fall within what the CDM calls ‘agriculture, forestry and other land use’ 
(AFOLU) approaches. These are part of the CDM itself, but also central to the UN’s REDD+, a 
nationally-led approach to addressing climate mitigation through forestry and land use 
interventions (UNFCCC 2013, UN-REDD 2013). Projects may sit formally under a national or sub-
national UN REDD umbrella, or be only loosely linked, and privately developed. However any 
project wishing to access climate finance by selling certified carbon credits must be approved 
under an agreed methodology. Routes include the CDM (allowing projects to produce credits for 
Kyoto compliance markets) the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) scheme (for pre-compliance 
markets), and a range of others including the Climate, Community and Biodiversity standards 
(CCB 2013) and Plan Vivo (2013). The VCS has emerged as the dominant standard for forest 
carbon accounting in developing countries, covering more than half the volume of forest carbon 
contracted by 2010 (VCSa 2013). Both the VCS and CDM stipulate particular methodologies and 
tools for use in planning, developing and verifying project activity under a range of project 
categories. These – and the requirement that projects must operate for at least 30 years, be 
monitored and reported on for at least 20 years and consider risks for over 100 years - all 
respond to the political and policy need to link carbon market imperatives with local level 
forestry and land use interventions. They have been developed by a particular constellation of 
climate modelling, environmental economics, biological, accountancy and project management 
expertises – as represented on the AFOLU committees for both the CDM and the VCS advisory 
groups (VCSb 2013). 
 
AFOLU project categories and associated methodologies include ‘Afforestation and 
Reforestation’ (AR) under CDM, or the VCS equivalent ‘Afforestation, Reforestation and 
Revegetation’ (ARR). This involves planting trees or otherwise converting non-forest to forest 
land, or increasing carbon stocks in woody vegetation (CDM 2013a). By contrast REDD-type 
projects involve avoiding ‘unplanned’ conversion of forests to non-forest areas (deforestation), 
or reduction of carbon stocks (degradation) (VCS  2013c). If the project involves avoiding 
otherwise planned logging or farming, it counts instead as Improved Forest Management (IFM) 
or Agricultural Land Management (ALM). Finally, there are specialist categories, such as 
Peatland Rewetting and Conservation (PRC). To date there are numerous VCS methodologies 
approved under a range of project categories. The VCS uses many CDM methodologies and 
tools, but project developers are also allowed to develop their own and submit these for 
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approval, so methodologies are continuously evolving, being replaced and updated. The 
respective websites have plenty of documents and guidance sheets to download, but these are 
not for the faint hearted given their multiplicity, and sometimes obscure terminology and 
technical requirements. The CDM’s booklet runs to 264 pages (CDM 2013b) while each of the 12 
VCS methodologies has around 200 pages of guidance notes (VCS  2013c). 
 
Thus:  
 
Developing forest carbon projects is complex and often daunting for project 
proponents....Successful project development requires complying with rigorous 
standards of analysing and documenting carbon benefits, working through an array of 
legal, business and community relations issues.... (as well as actually carrying out the  
work) (Olander and Ebeling, 2011:1). 
 
In response NGOs and consultancy firms have produced a large array of guides and manuals to 
help project developers navigate these challenges (e.g. Calmel et al 2010, Ingram et al 2009, 
Pearson et al 2009), while opportunities have blossomed for consultants to conduct project 
development operations.  
 
Project development involves multiple stages. First a scoping study or Project Idea Note (PIN) 
may be drafted. This is not formally required by VCS or CDM, but is often prepared to engage 
national governments, donors or investors. The World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund has developed a 
PIN format that is commonly used. A PIN includes preliminary characterisation of the baseline, 
estimates of forest carbon stocks and benefits, assessments of additionality, and evaluation of 
social and environmental impacts. It also includes a financial feasibility assessment, balancing 
project costs with prospective carbon revenues. Many carbon projects are abandoned at this 
stage, deemed infeasible as the sheer complexity of development combines with lack of 
profitability. Moreover carbon prices are currently very low, having dropped dramatically from 
their peak in mid 2008 and nearly halving in 2012 (Financial Times 2012), undermining the 
economic viability of many schemes without external subsidy from aid donors. In the absence of 
an international regulatory framework, and with continued disputes over monitoring and 
verification hindering an agreed mechanism for public project financing (Moss and Kovacevik 
2012) the voluntary market remains fragile and uncertain, with limited revenue flows. 
 
The next stage is the development of a Project Design Document (PDD) or Project Description 
(PD). It is at this point that rigorous, approved methodologies must be chosen and applied. 
These must respond to the project context, and carry implications for how many carbon credits 
might be claimed, and the particular data collection requirements for verification. It is no 
surprise that the advice industry has focused efforts on this crucial yet technically demanding 
stage. Finally, the PDD must be independently validated and later – once the project is up and 
running - verified for the issue of certified carbon credits.  
 
While approved methodologies vary considerably in their details, all share a set of basic 
elements: 
 
1. Demarcating the project boundaries and their spatial extent. 
2. Ensuring land eligibility – in relation to vegetation and tenure. 
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3. Establishing a baseline - including a change scenario in the absence of project activity, 
and a reference area.  
4. Demonstrating additionality - providing assurance that the claimed carbon effects would 
not have happened without the project. 
5. Quantifying carbon emission reductions through new project activities 
6. Assessing leakage that might occur through displacement of activities from the project 
site 
7. Evaluating non-permanence - assessing the risk that the project’s carbon effects will not 
last. 
 
As we go on to show, these generic methodological elements themselves carry with them a set 
of assumptions: about forests, land use and carbon as a commodity. Equally, their application 
necessarily relies on particular practices in collecting and interpreting data. We argue that these 
assumptions and practices, have a major impact on the way forest carbon projects are framed 
and designed, with implications for how they stand to be created on the ground. These are 
therefore not just neutral, objective scientific methodologies – although they are of course 
rigorous in their own terms - but carry with them a set of social, political, and moral implications 
with far reaching consequences. These are often invisible to the proponents of carbon forestry 
projects, whose backgrounds and intentions often align genuinely with the plentiful rhetoric 
about pro-poor benefits and sustainable development that enwraps forest carbon schemes. Yet 
as we argue, the sequence of moves from creating carbon as a globally tradable commodity to 
the detailed tools and methods used to verify carbon benefits, have a series of layered framing 
effects, promoting particular visions of a carbon landscape and potential pathways of change 
while excluding others.  
 
In the next sections we illustrate these processes and their implications through two forest 
carbon projects in West Africa. Our aim is not to critique the implementation and outcomes of 
these projects – neither is yet further than the design stage. Nor do we critique the intentions of 
project developers, who in both cases aim to be ‘pro-poor’. And our aim is certainly not to 
dismiss the idea of climate mitigation and forest carbon interventions, but to raise questions 
about the path dependency and forms of governmentality created by a set of methodologies 
whose assumptions and practices have not been sufficiently interrogated. 
 
3. Carbon forestry in West Africa: two cases 
 
3.1 Sierra Leone: WAPFOR 
 
In Sierra Leone carbon forestry is still at a relatively early stage; in early 2013 just seven projects 
were being planned or implemented (Fong-Cisneros 2013). However government staff, NGOs 
and timber and mining companies are enthusiastically embracing the envisaged new 
opportunities of carbon finance. As a senior forestry official put it ‘the future is bright... those 
are funding sources for the forest conservation and sustainable management that we need, but 
the government cannot provide’ (interview, Freetown, 15 March 2012). Our case study focuses 
on the Western Area Peninsular Forest Reserve (WAPFOR) whose dense humid forests cover 
about 17,600 hectares of the hills bordering the expanding coastal capital city of Freetown. This 
was Sierra Leone’s first forest reserve, declared by the British colonial administration in 1916 
with the original imperative of protecting the watersheds supplying the city’s population from 
the supposed ravages of the timber industry and shifting cultivation, and later for biodiversity – 
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declared a non-hunting forest reserve in 1972 to safeguard globally-valued bird and ape species. 
Visibility from Freetown brings the forest symbolic and political capital: as a government official 
argued  ‘WAPFOR is very, very critical, the Western Area forest is vital in so many ways, so it is 
very important that we protect it’ (interview, Freetown, 15 March 2012).  
 
A five-year ‘Conservation of the Sierra Leone WAPFOR’ Project was established and commenced 
operation in 2009, implemented by the German NGO Welthungerhilfe (WHH) in partnership 
with the government Forestry Division and National Forum for Environmental Action (ENFORAC) 
comprising environmental NGOs. The project initially took an established ‘conservation with 
development’ approach, re-demarcating a strict  reserve to protect water supplies and 
biodiversity, developing a 150 m buffer zone, and providing alternative livelihood activities and 
conservation education for key communities in the 30 surrounding villages. Under the slogan 
‘wata en forest na life’ (‘water in the forest is life’), the project’s central aim is to alleviate what 
are seen as intense deforestation and degradation pressures both from urban expansion at the 
reserve’s western end, and from small-scale farming, fuelwood harvesting and stone quarrying 
by rural communities (Moninger 2011). This contemporary project discourse echoes 
longstanding views that Sierra Leone’s forests are threatened by rapid deforestation, with poor 
people as its key agents. Views that a once more extensive forest cover is under accelerating 
decline extend back to early colonial times and have been updated by successive analysts 
(Fairhead and Leach 1998, Munro 2009). Sayer et al (1992: 944), for instance, suggested that ’50 
per cent of the country has conditions suitable for tropical rainforest, but less than 5 per cent is 
still covered with ....closed forest. Deforestation is mainly a result of the rapidly increasing 
human population requiring more agricultural land and fuelwood’.  
 
With the WAPFOR project’s main funding source from the European Commission due to end in 
2014, WHH has been developing a REDD+ project geared to voluntary carbon markets as an 
alternative source of  financing. The Austrian consultancy firm Osterreichische Bundesforste 
(OBF) was commissioned to conduct a series of scoping studies. Their detailed report and 
annexes (OBF 2011) included a Project Idea Note (PIN) that recommended proceeding with the 
development of a REDD+ project, and took many of the steps in methodology choice and 
application towards the eventual development of a Project description for external validation by 
the VCS. WHH are currently seeking funding and partnerships to finalise a Project Description 
and progress towards implementation of what is intended to be a pro-poor carbon forestry 
scheme. 
 
3.2  Ghana: Vision 2050 Carbon Credit Project 
 
In Ghana there is a well established national REDD programme, which has undertaken a variety 
of assessments, but the planned projects have not yet been established on the ground (Forest 
Carbon Partnership 2012). Outside this framework a number of smaller, private-led initiatives 
have taken off. One of the most prominent was the Vision 2050 project which operated across 
six regions in Ghana, claiming to involve 300,000 people, over land areas of 350,000ha. It aimed 
to develop a combination of forest protection and planting, both in farmers’ fields and on 
private land banks (Hashmiu 2012). According to the project website by 2013 100,000 ha of land 
banks had been acquired for tree planting, of which 38,000 ha had already been planted (Vision 
2050 2013) – although other project documents give different estimates. 
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In late 2010, the company running the project commissioned a feasibility study by the Swiss 
Forest Carbon Consulting, on behalf of Forest Carbon Traders, a company interested in selling 
carbon credits.  This clearly stated the project rationale: ‘Rates of deforestation in West Africa 
are among the highest in the world. Ghana’s tropical forest cover has decreased from 8 million 
hectares at the beginning of the 1900s to about 1.6 million hectares in 1990, and the 
deforestation rate is high: nearly 65,000 hectares per year. Virtually all forest currently left is 
located in forest reserves’ (TREES 2010:10). It concluded that ‘the project faces several high risks 
for denial of registration’ due to ambiguities about changes in land cover and additionality. It 
recommended going ahead only with a clearer definition of baselines.   
 
The project did go ahead, and was launched with great fanfare across a wide area in Brong 
Ahafo region. Baseline studies were commissioned, and a network of tree nurseries established 
to provide ‘carbon trees’ to project participants who handed over rights to the trees for a 20 
year period on the promise of an up-front payment, plus a regular if small revenue. In addition 
to private farmers who planted on their land, other farmers offered land areas for small 
plantation planting by the project. These areas were leased by the project and trees planted 
which were in turn sponsored by outside investors, including individuals, church groups and 
professional associations, who paid an establishment and regular maintenance charge with the 
promise of future carbon revenues. In some villages the project took over several hundred 
hectares, involving upwards of 50 families (Hashmiu 2012). However, the project’s up-front 
finance, provided by the project developer from his personal teak plantations, soon ran out, and 
attempts to source funds from donor agencies and other private sources failed. Thus despite 
thousands of agreements with local people having been signed, and transfers of land and trees 
made, no revenues or even start-up funds were forthcoming. Local people, and their chiefs, who 
had earlier welcomed the project as a source of much needed funding in the area, became 
seriously disgruntled. Political dimensions intervened and the project developer was accused of 
fraud, and eventually arrested, with a court case pending (Hashmiu 2012). Following a review, 
the company concluded that the original project plan, involving hundreds of farmers, was too 
costly and elaborate, and so unlikely to get registration through a carbon credit scheme. Instead, 
the small and medium-scale private plantation project was retained. This plan has yet to be fully 
financed, and by late 2012 a carbon broker was still being sought (Carbon Credit GH 2012).  
 
In neither Sierra Leone nor Ghana are these new carbon forestry projects arriving on a blank 
slate. Contemporary concern with climate change and carbon is merely the latest layer in long 
histories of interventions to protect, control, manage and extract from forest areas. In many 
instances local forest users have lost out through imposed restrictions on their livelihood 
activities in projects justified by discourses that they are forest destroyers. Calls to develop 
genuinely participatory forest management activities that build on local perspectives, priorities 
and knowledge of often non-linear, more complex people-vegetation relations have long been 
made, and indeed are echoed to some extent by current project developers, but their uptake in 
policy circles is hindered by entrenched discourses that case deforestation as one-way and local 
people as forest destroyers (Fairhead and Leach 1998, Mayers and Kotey 1996, Amanor 1999, 
2004).  
 
As we explore in further detail below, central aspects of  longstanding deforestation discourses 
in both countries are now being revived under the label of forest carbon. This partly reflects 
direct continuity between earlier interventions and new carbon forestry, with carbon money 
representing an opportunity to revive or expand longstanding plans. Indeed the projects 
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presented as carbon forestry today look very similar to what went before: the REDD+ project in 
WAPFOR as currently proposed appears as an archetypical forest conservation-with-
development project, aiming to create a buffer between pressures from local people and the 
conserved forests, while in Ghana, Vision 2050 is a classic forest conservation and tree planting 
effort typical of many in the area. Yet the focus on carbon as the forest ‘value’ to be conserved 
and traded brings an important difference, with projects now framed explicitly by a 
commoditisation and marketisation approach. The models and methodologies that are so 
central to carbon project development flow from this, and as we now go on to show, are applied 
in ways that do not merely recycle and repack established discourses about forest loss and 
blame, but actively strengthen them, cementing them into proposed institutional and political-
economic arrangements. This has important implications for what may eventually happen as 
these projects are implemented, and for who will gain or lose.  
 
4. Measuring and valuing forest carbon in project development practice 
 
We now unpack the seven generic elements of CDM and VCS methodologies introduced earlier 
in relation to the two case studies.  In the relatively simple Sierra Leone case, the VCS 
methodology VM0015 (‘avoided unplanned deforestation’) (VCS 2013d) was used for the 
scoping study and project development documentation prepared by OBF (2012). In Ghana no 
formal methodology has yet been used, but VM0009 (‘avoided deforestation’) (VCS 2013e) was 
suggested for assessing areas to be protected, or alternatively VM0006 (for mosaic 
deforestation). This could have been combined with CDM A/R and IFM methodologies for new 
tree planting (CDM 2013c). With such a complex project, a ‘grouped project’ approach would 
have been required to capture carbon benefits through the VCS. Nevertheless, for both cases 
the same seven elements were required and these are explained and discussed in turn below, 
focusing on VM0015 and VM0009 as illustrative examples, and examining their application, 
assumptions and exclusions in practice - as revealed in project preparation documents, key 
informant interviews and other literature. 
  
4.1 Demarcating project boundaries  
 
A first step involves defining the extent of the project area. In Sierra Leone, the project 
boundary was defined to coincide with the boundary of the forest reserve itself, as re-
demarcated in 2011 to cover existing areas of ‘intact’ forest (OBF 2011, Moninger 2011). In 
Ghana, a huge area of some 350,000ha was proposed, but in several non-contiguous sites, and 
confusion arose as to what was under the project and not. 
 
The definition of spatial boundaries is significant for several reasons. First, it is central to the 
business model, defining the area from which carbon credits can be sold, and so the potential 
revenue stream. In Sierra Leone, coincidence with the existing reserve left little flexibility for 
expansion, but in Ghana there were plans to expand the project significantly to wherever 
individuals were willing to sign up and lease land and trees. Second, the project boundary exists 
in relation to the ‘reference area’ where baseline carbon levels are calculated. This is supposed 
to be nearby and similar, so like is being compared with like at project inception. In Sierra Leone, 
that no high forest existed outside the reserve created difficulties in identifying a suitable 
reference area. In their scoping OBF used the whole Freetown Peninsular, but acknowledged 
that as this was under highly diverse forms of land use and socio-economic change, a different 
approach (including leaving part of the reserve itself outside the project boundary) would 
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eventually be needed for VCS compliance. Meanwhile as we show below, this choice of 
reference area was instrumental in shaping a baseline scenario of rapid deforestation. In Ghana, 
reference areas were specified areas including nearby forest reserves where longitudinal 
satellite data on deforestation were available. Again, it was unclear quite how similar these 
were to the project area, possibly disqualifying any submitted PD; yet this somewhat arbitrary 
specification – in effect an artificial line on a map - carried consequences for the treatment of 
resources and people. Outside the project area carbon is supposed to be depleted at a rate 
specified in the baseline scenario, and people are not supposed to benefit, whereas those inside 
are supposed to share in carbon benefits, and reductions in carbon loss are supposed to result in 
line with projected targets. Thus the seemingly arbitrary act of demarcation implied real 
consequences, both environmentally and socio-economically.  
 
Finally, the spatial boundaries of the project also define ownership, as the project area, or at 
least the carbon within it, must be shown to be under the control of the project developer.  In 
the Sierra Leone case this did not affect the status quo, as the entire WAPFOR was already 
under state land ownership and the expected project proponent would be under Ministerial 
mandate. Nevertheless the tight VCS definition of ownership does not recognise the forest use 
rights currently held by local people, implying that special provisions would need to be added to 
if they were not to lose these. In contrast in the Ghana case the VCS methodology requires the 
project to transfer carbon rights over the full 30 year project duration to the developer, implying 
that this is a straightforward legal process.  The feasibility study thus argued: ‘For the 
registration and implementation of the carbon project, the land tenure legislation and 
governance are essential. Long term control of the project land and activities must be 
established for a successful project and corruption activities linked to the project must be 
prevented’ (TREES, 2010: 12). Yet in Ghana, like many African rural settings, tenurial claims over 
land, trees, soils and so carbon are complex, multiple and overlapping. Chiefs notionally hold the 
land, but in interaction with diverse and often politically contested claims from the state and 
individuals (Ubink and Amanor 1999). Residual claims associated with identity and histories of 
residence, as well as ongoing negotiations over access, control and the ‘politics of possession’ 
(Sikor and Lund 2009, Peluso and Lund 2011) are likely to disrupt any transfer, risking ongoing 
dispute.  
 
Methodologies and project development practice tend either to favour settings where rights 
over resources are clearly defined and held by already-powerful actors (as in Sierra Leone), thus 
avoiding inconvenient disputes associated with ambiguous property rights, or, as in Ghana, to 
proceed as if ambiguity did not exist, opening the way for ongoing tenurial disputes which 
similarly tend to favour the contextually powerful. In this way, the commodification of carbon 
linked to boundary-creation methodologies encourages the promotion of particular forms of 
state or private property and control. 
 
4.2 Ensuring eligibility 
 
In order to fit relevant project classifications, projects have to show that the area complies with 
an accepted definition of ‘forest’. Under the CDM this is defined in relation to minimum area, 
minimum tree crown cover and minimum tree height, and under VCS, any internationally 
accepted standard. Countries may submit their own national standards. Ghana has defined a 
minimum area of 0.1ha, a minimum tree cover of 15% and a minimum tree height of 5m (CDM 
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2013d). Sierra Leone has not made a submission, so uses the default FAO national forest 
definition (0.5ha, 10%, 5m).  
 
Such measures and metrics come from standard production forestry, with static, uniform tree 
stands – yet most forest landscapes are not like this. In Sierra Leone, according to the national 
definition the entire WAPFOR constitutes forest and so is eligible for VCS crediting. But the 
definition excludes land under bush fallow cycles and village agroforestry management, such as 
exist today on the forest fringe and which were part of the peninsular forests’ history (Fairhead 
and Leach 1998). Thus definitions link carbon forestry exclusively with currently ‘intact’ high 
forest devoid of people, excluding any potential for generating carbon credits from currently 
lived-in landscapes. In Ghana, Vision 2050 is in the forest-savanna transition zone, yet 
definitions overlook cyclical and longer-term forest-savanna dynamics. In Brong Ahafo, there 
was a dominance of savanna grassland early in the twentieth century (Fairhead and Leach 
1998). By 1983 the area was heavily forested, with cocoa interspersed with large shade trees. A 
dry period and a build up of grass in savanna patches then enabled a massive forest fire, 
radically transforming the landscape back to a much more open form with ‘forest islands’ 
associated with past settlement sites and sacred areas.  Thus over time the areas that could be 
deemed ‘forest’ according to the standard measures have changed dramatically.  
 
Of course forest carbon projects are not restricted to contiguous forest areas of a standard 
form, and methodologies allow for mosaic or grouped projects. Nonetheless the difficulties of 
fitting real, dynamic forest landscapes into eligibility criteria often means constructing a 
simplified image of a forest – as spatially distributed patches or a block - and a pattern of 
landscape change – through frontier or mosaic deforestation – in ways that fit the eligible 
categories. Such classificatory categories in turn easily invoke certain assumptions about how 
the pattern emerged, often reinforcing established narratives. Thus in the Ghana case, the 
scoping study’s satellite analysis highlighted the mosaic nature of forest cover and the potential 
for high levels of inter-annual variability: ‘Today's situation in the project area...shows a small 
scale patchy structure of different vegetation types. This patchy structure has increased since 
1986...and includes more areas with no or very little vegetation. Generally the intensity of active 
vegetation appears lower than in the 1986 reference, though this could be due to inter-annual 
weather differences, e.g. draught (sic) effects’ (TREES 2010: 22). Yet struggling to interpret such 
dynamism, mosaic forests were assumed to represent ‘remnants’ of past extensive forest areas, 
rather than created forest islands associated with settlement and past use. In Sierra Leone, the 
image of frontier deforestation assumes an external threat of encroachment on a broad front, 
usually by local inhabitants, rather than the picture suggested by social science analyses and key 
informants – of speculative real estate land grabbing in particular places, with rural peoples less 
interested in land expansions than forest access for collection of forest products (Munro 2009, 
interviews, Freetown, March 16 2012). Thus in both cases, embedded in the classifications are 
particular narratives about cause and effect, as well as designations of response and solution, 
that obscure key aspects of local circumstance and context.   
 
4.3 Establishing a baseline  
 
This is a critical step, defining the ‘business as usual’ situation against which any additional value 
to a carbon project is measured. There are two elements: the baseline reference area, and the 
baseline carbon emission scenario – what would happen if no project intervention took place. 
Where deforestation is ‘unplanned’, constructing baseline deforestation scenarios involves 
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extrapolating from past historical data, usually based on satellite imagery, in ways informed by 
particular methodologies. 
 
In Sierra Leone, VCS’s VM0015 methodology requires three satellite images over 10-15 years, 
one within the last two years. The OBF study compared satellite data from 2000 with that from 
2006 and 2011, producing a set of land and forest change maps. From this they concluded a 
significant (9%) loss of forest cover on the peninsular over the period, including some 
encroachment of the old forest reserve (4% change) at the urban end, but most outside the 
forest reserve, consisting of changes from medium high forest to ‘shrub’ and ‘other’ vegetation. 
They note that deforestation ‘doubled from 3% from 2000-2006 (0.5% annually) to 6% from 
2006-11 (1.2% annually)’ (OBF 2011: 12). They then projected forward to 2031 by linking this 
historical baseline deforestation to the assumed ‘major driver of deforestation which is urban 
expansion due to population growth and urbanisation’ (OBF 2012: 4), by extrapolating from 
apparent trends in published population data for the years 1985 and 2004 (Koroma et al. 2006). 
They thus produced two alternative baseline deforestation scenarios, assuming relatively faster 
or slower deforestation, both suggesting a sufficient level of ‘avoided deforestation’ for the 
project to proceed.  
 
In the mosaic forest setting of the Ghana case, VM0009 was chosen: a methodology in which 
2000 random point samples are required from the reference region, and each is classified as 
forest or non-forest.  This is complemented by satellite imagery for at least five time points over 
a 10-15 year reference period. The baseline assessment estimates conversion to permanent 
cropped area – but notably does not allow for shifting cultivation and fallow areas. However 
problems with the availability of satellite imagery meant that the full analysis was never 
achieved. 
 
In these methodological applications, uncertainties are conveniently downplayed. Thus in Sierra 
Leone the OBF team struggled to distinguish between secondary forest and shrub in their 
satellite imagery, noting that this has important implications since secondary forest counts 
definitionally as forest, but  shrub does not. They therefore called for detailed ground-truthing, 
but it is unclear whether this was followed through. Taken to the extreme, if all the shrub land 
were redefined as secondary forest, there would have been no ‘deforestation’ at all. Moreover – 
and not acknowledged in OBF’s analysis – their map shows forest expansion in some rural areas 
south of the reserve; a process perhaps linked to villagers moving out of relatively unprofitable 
farming in favour of fishing and ecotourism. Yet attention to such trends would undermine the 
picture of rapid deforestation outside and threatening the reserve which is so central to the 
justification of the REDD+ project.   
 
Assuming that future trends can be inferred from past practices is also problematic given that 
changing supply patterns may affect demand, and forest use and its drivers are not necessarily 
linear. On the Freetown Peninsular, for instance, deforestation has not reflected steady 
‘population growth and urban expansion’ but booms and waves of clearance for urban 
settlement, associated with returnees at the end of the country’s civil war in 2002-3, and the 
more recent construction of enormous US Embassy and EU compounds. Most houses being built 
on the forest edge are by Freetown elites looking for space and views on the city’s periphery, 
not by poor, growing urban masses (Munro 2009).  
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Thus in getting round the inevitable uncertainties involved in the estimations of baseline 
scenarios, assumptions are brought to bear which  often rejuvenate the established 
deforestation narratives of the past, and also support contemporary carbon commodification – 
while occluding alternative, non-linear people-forest dynamics.  
 
4.4 Demonstrating additionality 
  
VCS methodologies require Project Descriptions to present a tight, clear argument for 
‘additionality’, suggesting  an analysis with several elements (VCS 2013f)  including the 
identification of alternative land-use scenarios if the project is not implemented, investment and 
barrier analysis to show that the proposed activities would not occur without the project, and 
analysis of ‘common practice’. The CDM rule book elaborates:  ‘Project participants in an SSC 
A/R project must demonstrate ... that the project would not otherwise be implemented because 
of one of the listed...[including] Barriers relating to local tradition, inter alia: a. Traditional 
knowledge or lack thereof, of laws and customs, market conditions, practices; b. Traditional 
equipment and technology’ (CDM 2013e). Existing practices are thus deemed ‘barriers’ to be 
surmounted by an approved project,  implying that they are causing the problem to be 
addressed.  Here again, arguments became enwrapped in discursive assumptions about patterns 
and processes of land use change, and the assumed consequences of inaction – so reinforcing 
the image of benefits from the proposed project activities. 
 
In the Ghana case, Vision 2050 argued for additionality by deploying the standard narrative 
around deforestation in the area, evoking an image of a past pristine forest area threatened and 
savannised, especially by ‘slash and burn’ agriculture. Any intervention to protect so-called 
‘remnant’ forest tracts or plants trees to replace assumed lost forest is thus seen to reverse the 
trend. This narrative is so familiar as to have become accepted ‘fact’ in Brong Ahafo and beyond, 
despite challenges to its evidence and assumptions (Fairhead and Leach 1998, Amanor 1993). 
Yet the feasibility study’s satellite analysis was more uncertain, finding that ‘the natural forest 
and the teak plantations within the project area are not identifiable, and the project area 
vegetation cannot be distinguished from the outside project vegetation. This leaves room for 
some interpretations which would negatively impact the feasibility of a carbon project’ (TREES, 
2010: 23). The study also questioned whether project activities were really distinct from the 
‘common practice’ of tree planting, community forestry and agroforestry projects in the area, 
dating back over decades.  
 
In Sierra Leone, OBF summarised arguments for additionality as follows: ‘The assessment shows 
that the WAPFOR is currently under severe pressure, especially from rapid urban 
expansion/encroachment into the reserve. The business as usual scenario is characterized by 
low levels of law enforcement, little staff capacity, little human resources, little financial means 
for effective protected areas management. Consequently, there will be limited means to 
mitigate emissions without the project. The project has funding by EC and Welthungerhilfe only 
until 2014, therefore the financial sustainability is currently not secured. => YES the project is 
additional’ (OBF 2012: 8). Again, this argument reworks long-established narratives about 
ongoing deforestation problems that can be ‘solved’ only by external intervention – in this case 
the imposition of strengthened forest protection mechanisms. Impetus is thus given to long-
tried conservation approaches, to be implemented now with greater force and carbon funding. 
Yet this fails to question why protectionist approaches might have failed in the past, 
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underplaying reasons that have more to do with conflicting Ministry of Lands policies and elite 
corruption, than with incapacity in the forest service (interviews, Freetown, March 15 2012). 
Moreover if a forest has been reserved for many decades as WAPFOR has, in effect ‘removed’ 
from the cycle of settlement, bush fallow and wood use, it is questionable whether a new 
justification for the same reservation in the name of REDD is really ‘additional.’ 
 
By ignoring such questions, however, additionality justifications help lock in to a particular 
narrative and pathway that casts existing practice as bad and proposed intervention as both 
additional and good. This, in turn, is central to earning carbon revenues, according to the terms 
of the VCS and CDM methodologies. 
  
4.5 Quantifying carbon emission reductions 
 
A bottom line comes in the carbon numbers - will the emissions reductions through the 
proposed project interventions generate sufficient carbon credits to cover project costs? This 
crucial step in the project design and verification process requires considerable data, and the 
presentation of a careful calculation that assesses the baseline against the reductions through 
project activities, less the leakage and adding in a buffer for non-permanence risk (see below). 
Different methodologies include different carbon pools – above and below ground biomass, soil 
carbon and so on; some require intensive field sampling, forest inventories and measurement 
while others accept estimates from literature. 
 
VM0015, which the WAPFOR project developers used, allows literature values. By combining a 
published biomass map of Sierra Leone (Saatchi et al 2011) with satellite imagery and default 
carbon conversion factors supplied by the IPCC (OBF 2012 Annex 3), they produced a 
preliminary analysis suggesting ‘a mitigation potential of the project that ranges from 124,000 
tCO2e to 57,000 tCO2e per year’ (OBF 2012: 1) – although acknowledging the eventual need for 
a more detailed, ground-truthed forest inventory. VM0009, as suggested for Ghana, by contrast 
requires the establishment of permanent fixed sample plots. Following initial verification, 
monitoring, involving the measurement of all pools claimed for every five years, is required to 
assure the flow of carbon credits are in line with the initial estimates of reductions. The 
challenges and costs of such efforts in AFOLU projects help explain why there are so few in the 
overall CDM and VCS portfolio. The Ghana project found start-up costs for this sort of 
measurement effort prohibitive, so only preliminary estimates could be made based on the 
basis of initial tree surveys. These suggested that even with generous assumptions credits of 
only 2 tCO2e per hectare per year were likely to be realised; approximately 40,920 tons of CO2 
for a crediting period of 20 years from the 1138 ha study area (TREES 2010:23).  
 
Despite the elaborate and systematic approaches required by the currently approved 
methodologies, many judgements are involved – which carbon pools to include? Which 
literature based estimates to accept? For methodologies such as VM0009 requiring random 
sampling, and in a highly patterned landscape such as Ghana’s forest-savanna mosaic, questions 
arise about the extent to which sample sites can be fully representative. Given measurement 
and verification challenges, approaches involving farm forestry and community management are 
often rejected as too complex and costly. In Ghana, the project failed on a number of fronts, but 
it was clear that the originally-proposed community approach would require insurmountable 
measurement costs and fail to yield sufficient carbon credits. This helped drive the project 
towards its eventual plantation model. A protection model for a reasonably uniform forested 
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area represents an even more straightforward option, reducing measurement and 
establishment costs, and likely to generate the maximum number of carbon credits by area. 
Protection measures on a frontier boundary are also relatively simpler to implement, keeping 
‘agents of deforestation’ (people) out, and the carbon protected inside. This represents a 
reworking of long-established ‘fortress conservation’ models, widely used (and critiqued) in the  
1980s and 90s and adapted into ‘conservation with development’ through the addition of buffer 
zones and alternative livelihood activities (e.g. Adams 2004). This is essentially the model that 
WAPFOR has long used and that is now being (re) promoted through REDD+. OBF’s financial 
analyses showed the approach to be financially feasible even at low carbon prices. However, 
significantly, it questioned whether enough carbon revenue could be generated to fund 
community projects, as well as forest guards: ‘the most profitable scenario did not include pro-
poor measures’ (OBF 2012: 1) – an implication that deeply worried the NGOs proposing the 
project, who genuinely wish to develop a pro-poor approach.  
 
4.6 Assessing leakage 
 
Leakage involves both activity displacement and market leakage. Most AFOLU methodologies 
focus on the former, requiring assurance that if a carbon emitting activity is prevented in the 
project area it is not simply displaced to nearby areas, resulting in no net decline in emissions 
overall.  Methodologies require this to be assessed by reference to a ‘leakage belt’ around the 
project area (as in VM0015) or a leakage area not necessarily even contiguous with the project 
area (as in VM0009). VM0009 for example requires the establishment of large 2ha plots in the 
leakage area. Observations and estimates derived are supposed to be used to shift the 
cumulative deforestation model according to the level of leakage through activity displacement.  
 
In practice, however, verification approval tends to be based not on hard data, but on a good 
argument, and a sense that the project document has looked at the options and sensibly tried to 
tackle them. In this vein the WAPFOR scoping study argued plausibly that the leakage potential 
from the project is limited and will be addressed, as ‘leakage caused by stopping urban 
expansion will not be a major factor as there are no other forest areas in the vicinity of 
Freetown. There are indications that the majority of energy demand for Freetown is supplied 
from up-country, i.e. not by woodfuel harvested in the forest reserve. Alternative livelihood 
measures for the poor using the forests are foreseen as well as leakage management areas’ 
(OBF 2012: 9). Yet it is relatively straightforward to make the case for leakage limitation in a 
project involving a large contiguous forest area under project control, such as this. It is much 
more difficult in cases like the Ghanaian example, involving mobile people, multiple livelihood 
activities including trade, and unclear and unenforced project boundaries, likely not even known 
to local people. In such circumstances, ‘displacement’ of activities and so leakage is inevitable. 
Awareness of this fed into the Vision 2050 project’s shift to a more controllable, plantation 
approach.  
 
4.7 Evaluating non-permanence  
 
Finally, VCS and CDM methodologies require projects to address the risk of ‘non-permanence’ 
over the (usually 30 year) project period (CDM 2013f, VCS 2013g). A variety of factors are listed 
which might affect ‘permanence’, including internal factors (such as project management 
failure), external factors (such as land tenure) and natural risks (such as fire).  
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Such risks are clearly very real, in West African landscapes and political-economic contexts 
which – if the last 30 years are any guide - are thoroughly dynamic and ‘non-permanent’. In 
Brong Ahafo for instance landscapes and livelihoods have been radically transformed since the 
great fire of 1983, which decimated cocoa and encouraged a shift to open field maize 
production in the area. With the changing production landscape came changing economic and 
social relations, with new tenure arrangements around maize fields compared to forest cocoa 
plots. In-migrants not linked to the chiefly lineages gained land and increased income, clearing 
new areas. And with the maize boom in the area came new investments, including tarred roads 
and the growth of small towns and businesses (Afikorah-Danquah 1997; Amanor 1993). 
Meanwhile fire is an ongoing part of a complex and ever-changing forest-savanna mosaic. In 
Sierra Leone, the last 30 years have seen massive environmental and socio-political change 
linked to the 1989 – 2002 civil war and its aftermath, related migration dynamics, mining, and a 
recent wave of large-scale foreign land investments for food and biofuels (Leach 2012, Richards 
1996). ‘Permanence’ is just not a feature of such non-equilibrial ecological, social and political 
systems, in either country. 
 
Nevertheless, project risk analyses tend to portray stasis as the norm, and risk factors as 
operating gradually and incrementally. For WAPFOR, for instance, OBF’s assessment concluded 
that ‘There is a risk that the current high political will and interest to preserve the remaining 
forest is weakened over time... Another risk to the success of the project is prevailing poverty 
and ineffective alternative livelihood measures which force the poor to exploit forest resources 
unsustainably.  However, the preliminary standardized risk analysis as required by 
VCS has been clearly passed’ (OBF 2011: 8-9).  For Vision 2050  the feasibility assessment was 
more circumspect, pointing to a number of risks including tenure dynamics and so unclear, and 
challengeable ‘carbon rights’ (TREES, 2010: 27). 
 
Internal factors around ‘political will’ and project management should certainly not be 
underestimated. In the Ghana case, after all, the project folded and the director ended up being 
arrested for fraud, all within five years, let alone 30. While this case may be an outlier, however,  
long-term reliance on external funds – so often necessary for project viability  – can never be 
assured. Donor funds are rarely committed for more than 3-5 years, and the dynamic nature of 
donor policies as well as national politics may mean that project funds dry up, threatening 
project permanence in more fundamental ways than risk analyses account for. 
 
While the logic of assuring permanence is clear in terms of the imperatives and methodologies 
of carbon accounting, this again pushes project design in particular directions. The VCS and CDM 
stipulate that as much as 60% can be withheld from carbon credit revenues if non-permanence 
risk is deemed high. This criterion thus also favours apparently stable and controllable 
landscapes, with clearcut state or privately-controlled protection or plantation forestry once 
again trumping any lived-in carbon landscape with multiple users. It also provides a disincentive 
to endogenously defined development. For instance, if the carbon had been controlled by an 
external project at the time of the great fire in Ghana’s Wenchi district, the incentive would 
have been to re-establish the forested area and cocoa production, despite the period of drying 
and shift to savanna that had occurred – possibly undermining forest sustainability. This in turn 
would have prevented the substantial and more widely shared economic growth that occurred 
with the growth of maize as a key commodity. Now carbon projects are encouraging a return to 
cocoa and the reestablishment of shade trees, but will the sought-after stable forest carbon 
landscape really prove achievable in the face of ongoing ecological dynamics? And are there not 
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other ways of reducing carbon emissions more compatible with economic development and 
poverty reduction? These may exist, but are not being sought as long as methodologies push 
projects in particular directions towards (perhaps illusory) images of permanent carbon forests. 
 
5. Conclusions: Pathways and the politics of carbon forest measurement  
 
In a review of CDM projects, Thomas et al (2010:880) noted that of a total of 1600 approved 
projects, only four were focused on afforestation and reforestation and none of these were in 
Africa. Investigating these cases, they argued that four factors encouraged successful CDM 
approval: initial funding support from large donors to cover up-front costs; design and 
implementation guided by large organizations with technical expertise; establishment on land 
associated with secure property rights (private or state land); and where most of the revenue 
from certified carbon credits was returned to local communities neighbouring the project.  
 
With the exception of the last requirement – community-benefit sharing – our analysis supports 
these conclusions. Yet we have gone beyond empirical observation of which kinds of projects do 
(and do not) get approved, to explore why. In particular, we have argued and illustrated that the 
very ways in which CDM and VCS methodologies, protocols and requirements are constructed 
and applied – the social and political lives of models and measurements - tend to create path 
dependencies that push project design in particular directions.  Almost by default, and often  
against the wishes of project designers, ‘fortress’ forms of conservation forestry in reserves, or 
uniform plantations, under clear state or private control, become the only way that carbon 
value can be appropriated through these mechanisms. In the Ghana case, the project appears to 
have failed at the first hurdle because of the fundamental mismatch between more complex, 
dynamic, mosaic realities and the requirements of MRV methodologies. The result has been a 
shift from a community-based project, protecting and planting trees on farms, to a plantation 
style alternative. In Sierra Leone, WAPFOR offers greater prospects of successful approval given 
its longstanding basis in a conservation forestry reserve, but it will prove challenging to reconcile 
local stakeholders’ desire for a ‘pro-poor’ project and ongoing socio-political dynamics around 
land with the push for a strict reserve approach suggested by measurement protocols, and likely 
limited carbon revenues to fund poor people’s livelihoods.  In both settings, commodified 
carbon and the institutional and methodological infrastructure co-produced with it, are thus co-
constructing particular landscape pathways, with fortress style reserves or plantations likely to 
become the dominant approach. And in both settings, despite rhetoric to the contrary, it is 
poorer and already marginalised land and forest users who are most likely to lose out.  Fortress 
forestry and conservation, deeply critiqued on equity and sustainability grounds (Brockington 
2002, Adams 2004, Dressler et al 20010, Fletcher 2010), appear to be on the rise once again in 
today’s carbon forestry era. Pointing this out is not an argument for abandoning carbon forestry 
altogether, but for linking it more firmly to social justice for forest communities. Greater 
awareness of the roles of methodologies in this is crucial. 
 
As we have shown modelling and measurement processes are not just technical but social and 
political, bringing with them and thus cementing particular views of landscape and social 
relations that in turn translate into project pathways that bring real material consequences. In 
the process, other possibilities – including alternative pathways that might treat and value 
carbon as part of complex, lived-in landscapes, or respond more adaptively to less equilibrial 
people-forest relations, are occluded. We have, in particular, highlighted how methodologies 
invoke landscape stability and control (deeply questionable given ongoing socio-political and 
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ecological dynamics) in establishing project boundaries, eligibility and permanence.  Equally, 
methodologies and applications reproduce and reinforce (also deeply questionable) views of 
one-way deforestation, in constructing baselines and additionality, filling data gaps, and 
justifying project urgency. As these cases reveal, long-established deforestation narratives, and 
the imperatives of the new political economy of carbon, are now interacting in ways that 
strengthen both. 
 
This co-construction of methodologies and politics has involved a particular constellation of 
expertises which frame methods in particular ways, excluding other considerations.  VCS and 
CDM methodological debates are dominated by climate modellers, environmental economists, 
forest and soil biologists, accountants and business project managers – but notably not 
anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, ethicists or moral philosophers. Perhaps even 
more significantly, local ground level perspectives have been excluded. These methodologies 
were developed for an imagined neat world of carbon cycle models and finance, from which the 
difficult complexities of real-life settings could be excluded. They were also developed to treat 
forest carbon as a commodity, tradable on global markets; a view that contrasts sharply with 
how local people in West Africa value and experience their landscapes. As participants in 
projects, expected to be ‘beneficiaries’ of carbon finance, and ultimately the drivers of carbon 
mitigation, their perspectives have often been sidelined, or at best marginalised to a separate 
arena of ‘social safeguards’ in projects designed by others.   
 
In the seemingly technical world of MRV assessments, there is therefore a much deeper, but 
often not explicit and discussed, exercise of power on-going, with distributional consequences. 
This can happen even in the most well-meaning project, run by the most noble and committed 
people. It is this inadvertency, almost blindness to consequences, that is perhaps most worrying. 
Surely any effort to mitigate the potentially catastrophic consequences of climate change must 
be a good thing, some say. But in our enthusiasm to do something and to tap potential flows of 
climate funds, that danger is that we draw with insufficient reflection on methodologies that 
lock us into narrow carbon pathways that may prove neither sustainable nor socially just. 
Globally, reworking forest carbon pathways towards sustainability and social justice thus 
requires more critical reflection on their fundamental framings and the roles of methodologies 
in these, in turn enabling genuine space for forest users’ perspectives and priorities to shape 
projects in practice.  
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